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ARTICLE OPEN
Using digital surveillance tools for near real-time mapping of
the risk of infectious disease spread
Sangeeta Bhatia 1✉, Britta Lassmann2, Emily Cohn3, Angel N. Desai2, Malwina Carrion 2,4, Moritz U. G. Kraemer3,5,6, Mark Herringer7,
John Brownstein3, Larry Madoff 2, Anne Cori1,9 and Pierre Nouvellet1,8,9
Data from digital disease surveillance tools such as ProMED and HealthMap can complement the field surveillance during ongoing
outbreaks. Our aim was to investigate the use of data collected through ProMED and HealthMap in real-time outbreak analysis. We
developed a flexible statistical model to quantify spatial heterogeneity in the risk of spread of an outbreak and to forecast short
term incidence trends. The model was applied retrospectively to data collected by ProMED and HealthMap during the 2013–2016
West African Ebola epidemic and for comparison, to WHO data. Using ProMED and HealthMap data, the model was able to robustly
quantify the risk of disease spread 1–4 weeks in advance and for countries at risk of case importations, quantify where this risk
comes from. Our study highlights that ProMED and HealthMap data could be used in real-time to quantify the spatial heterogeneity
in risk of spread of an outbreak.
npj Digital Medicine            (2021) 4:73 ; https://doi.org/10.1038/s41746-021-00442-3
INTRODUCTION
Recent epidemics and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic under-
score the importance of understanding the risk of infectious
disease spread in real-time to support public health prevention
and containment measures. The emergence of novel infectious
diseases has accelerated over the past several decades as a result
of significant changes in land use, population growth, and
increasing international travel and trade1,2. Outbreaks that begin
in the most remote parts of the world can now spread swiftly to
urban centres and to countries far away with global conse-
quences3. A potent example of this phenomenon is the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic that originated in China, and has spread to
practically every country and region around the world at the time
of writing4.
Outbreak analysis and real-time modelling have provided key
inputs to inform public health response in past outbreaks and
pandemics5–7 as well as during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic8–10.
Critical to model performance is the quality of data incorporated into
forecasting algorithms. Reliable data streams that are available in
real-time to inform risk assessments are therefore crucial11. While
data on the number of cases and deaths collected through
traditional surveillance, for example via existing public health
infrastructure, are robust, collecting these data is resource intensive,
and the data are therefore only available for upstream analysis after
considerable delay12.
Internet-based disease detection and monitoring tools offer
real-time and rapid data dissemination on emerging infectious
diseases around the world. Digital disease surveillance is less
costly and time consuming compared to traditional surveillance.
However the data acquired are subject to more noise than those
collected by traditional public health surveillance. Digital surveil-
lance tools are now recognised as important adjunct tools to
traditional disease surveillance in the rapid recognition and
monitoring of emerging infectious disease threats13,14. While
there has been a growing interest in using various internet-based
data streams for epidemiological investigations15–18, to date, no
automated framework that combines data streams, analyses them
in a statistically robust manner, and produces actionable reports in
near real-time has been developed.
The Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED, www.
promedmail.org) was one of the first entrants in the field of digital
disease surveillance19. ProMED collates information from formal
and informal sources including media reports, official reports,
social media, local observers, and a network of clinicians
throughout the world. Reports generated through bottom-up
surveillance are reviewed, vetted, and commented on by a team
of subject matter experts before being posted to the ProMED
network. ProMED reports reach more than 80,000 followers in at
least 185 countries multiple times per day20. Outbreak analysts
and subject matter experts at ProMED have raised timely alarms
about major outbreaks in the past, such as warning about the
spread of Zika to the Americas21, or early detection of SARS22.
ProMED has been internationally recognised for providing the first
detailed report and risk assessment of a cluster of pneumonia
cases of unknown aetiology in Wuhan, China in December 2019
leading to the COVID-19 pandemic23.
HealthMap (www.healthmap.org) is another widely used tool
for disease outbreak monitoring. In addition to ProMED alerts,
HealthMap utilises online news aggregators, eyewitness reports
and other formal and informal sources of information and allows
for visualisation of alerts on a map24. The surveillance data
collected by HealthMap and ProMED has been incorporated into
the Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources (EIOS) surveillance
system, developed by the World Health Organization (WHO). Both
ProMED and HealthMap are used by key public health bodies,
including the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
and the WHO.
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In this study, we propose a new statistical framework to
estimate and visualise risks posed by outbreak events. Our
approach integrates multiple data streams to quantify spatial
heterogeneity in the risk of disease spread. A secondary objective
is to explore the potential of such framework to forecast the future
incidence trajectory. We report a retrospective analysis of the
2013–16 West African Ebola epidemic using the data curated by
ProMED and HealthMap. To assess the robustness of this digital
surveillance data, we also applied the framework retrospectively
to data collated by the WHO that was made available at the end of
this epidemic. We present a comparison of the near real-time
ProMED and HealthMap data with the retrospective WHO data
and the results of the spatio-temporal analysis carried out on
these three data sources. A key output of our model is the
quantification of the risk of the spread of an outbreak, and for
each country where that risk comes from. Our analysis based
solely on epidemic data available through ProMED/HealthMap
provides a realistic appraisal of their strengths and weaknesses.
Results
Comparison of ProMED, HealthMap and WHO data. Incidence
time series were computed from ProMED, HealthMap and WHO
data for the three mainly affected countries, Guinea, Liberia and
Sierra Leone, and are shown in Fig. 1 (see Supplementary Fig. 1 for
an example of the pre-processing workflow).
We measured the correlation between the daily and weekly
incidence time series derived from ProMED, HealthMap and WHO
data using Pearson’s correlation coefficient. There were substantial
differences between the daily incidence time series derived from the
three data sources, particularly at the peak of the epidemic.
However, despite these discrepancies, the weekly incidence derived
from ProMED and HealthMap was moderately to highly correlated
with that reported by WHO later (Pearson’s correlation coefficients
aggregated across the three countries 0.44 and 0.74, respectively, p
value < 0.001, also see Supplementary Fig. 2 for weekly trends).
To broadly assess the extent to which any differences in incidence
would impact the quantification of transmissibility throughout the
epidemic, we estimated the time-varying transmissibility, measured
by the reproduction number Rt (the average number of secondary
cases at time t per infected individual25), using the incidence from
each of the three data sources (Fig. 1). Rt was estimated
independently for each country using the R package EpiEstim26
over a sliding time window of 4 weeks. There were substantial
differences in the estimates of Rt according to the incidence data
source used (Fig. 1b). The correlation between the median Rt
estimates from ProMED or HealthMap data with the estimates from
WHO data varied from weak (0.30, between reproduction number
from WHO and ProMED in Guinea) to very strong (0.72, between




















































































Fig. 1 Comparison of incidence trends and R estimates Comparison of national daily incidence trends and R estimates from ProMED,
HealthMap and WHO data for Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. a Daily incidence derived from ProMED (blue), HealthMap (green) and WHO
data (orange). Daily incidence that were not directly available from ProMED and HealthMap data and which were therefore imputed (see
Methods) are shown in lighter shade of blue and green, respectively. WHO data were aggregated to country level. The y-axis differs for each
plot. b The median time-varying reproduction number Rt estimated using the WHO data (orange), ProMED (blue) and HealthMap (green) data.
The shaded regions depicts the 95% credible intervals (95% CrI) for the Rt estimates. The reproduction number was estimated on sliding
windows of 28 days with a Gamma prior with mean 1 and variance 0.25, using the R package EpiEstim26. Estimates shown at time t are for the
28-day window finishing on day t.
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Risk of spatial spread. A spatially explicit branching process
model (see Methods) was used to forecast short-term future
incidence and predict the presence or absence of cases in a
country. For each week and each country in Africa, our model
generated an alert if the predicted incidence (using a predeter-
mined percentile of the forecast interval) was greater than 0. We
classified an alert for a given week as a true alert when the
observed incidence was also greater than 0, as a false alert when
no cases were observed, and as a missed alert if cases were
observed but were not predicted by the model. Using different
percentiles of the forecast (e.g., the median or the 95th percentile)
yielded different rates of true, false and missed alerts, which were
summarised in a ROC curve.
We found that the model allowed us to robustly predict the
presence or absence of cases in all countries up to a week in
advance. Overall, our model achieved high sensitivity (i.e., true
alert rate) but variable specificity (i.e., 1 - false alert rate).
Maximising the average between sensitivity and specificity led
to 93.7% sensitivity and 96.0% specificity at 42.5% threshold
(Fig. 2a). The sensitivity of the model remained high over a longer
forecast horizon while the specificity deteriorated with more false
alerts being raised 4 weeks ahead (Supplementary Fig. 47).
We tested the performance of the model in predicting the
presence of cases in countries other than the three majorly
affected countries (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone). Both the
sensitivity and the specificity of the model remained high under
this more stringent criterion. The average of sensitivity and
specificity was maximum at 92.5% threshold in this case with
85.7% sensitivity and 81.7% specificity (Supplementary Fig. 48).
Similarly, the model exhibited high sensitivity (83.3%) and
specificity (82.0%) in predicting presence of cases in weeks
following a week with no observed cases in all countries in Africa
(Supplementary Fig. 49) at 93% threshold (chosen to maximise the
average between sensitivity and specificity). Out of the 9 one-
week ahead missed alerts in this case, 3 were in Liberia towards
the end of the epidemic, after Liberia had been declared Ebola
free on two separate occasions27,28. The serial interval distribution
that we have used does not account for very long intervals
between infections such as that associated with sexual transmis-
sion of Ebola Virus Disease29. Using the latest available data on
pairs of primary and secondary infections and models that allow
for more heterogeneity in the distribution of cases e.g., using
Negative Binomial distributions could potentially improve the
assessment of risk of spread in such cases30,31.
The choice of a threshold at which to raise an alert is subjective
and involves a trade-off between sensitivity and specificity. In
general, using a high threshold to raise an alert leads to high
sensitivity with a reasonably high specificity (Supplementary Fig.
50). The cut-off for raising an alert can be informed by the relative
costs of missed and false alerts potentially using a higher cut-off
when the observed incidence is low. It is also worth noting that
where our model failed to raise an alert in a week, either a true or
a false alert had been raised in the recent weeks in all but one
instance, indicating a potential risk of spread of the epidemic to
that country.
These results suggest that the model is able to capture and
even anticipate the spatial spread of the epidemic. Importantly, as
the model is fitted to data from any of the three data sources
accumulating over the course of the epidemic, it is able to predict
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Fig. 2 Predicted weekly presence of cases in each country. a The True and False alert rates using different thresholds for classification for
alerts raised 1 (violet), 2 (light violet), 3 (dark pink) and 4 (green) weeks ahead. The black curve depicts the overall True and False alert rates. On
each curve, the dot shows the True and False Alert rates at 42.5% threshold. For a given threshold (xth percentile of the forecast interval), we
defined a True alert for a week where the xth percentile of the forecast interval and the observed incidence for a country were both greater
than 0; false alert for a week where the threshold for a country was greater than 0 but the observed incidence for that country was 0; and
missed alert for a week where the threshold for a country was 0 but the observed incidence for that country was greater than 0. True alert rate
is the ratio of correctly classified true alerts to the total number of true and missed alerts (i.e., (true alerts)/(true alerts+missed alerts)). False
alert rate is similarly the ratio of false alerts to the total number of false alerts and weeks of no alert (where the observed and the threshold
incidence are both 0). b The True (green), False (orange) and Missed (red) 1 week ahead alerts using the 42.5th percentile of the forecast
interval as threshold. The figure only shows countries on the African continent for which either the 42.5th percentile of the predicted
incidence or the observed incidence was greater than 0 at least once. The first alert in each country is shown using larger squares. Alerts in a
country in a week where there were no observed cases in the previous week are shown using triangles. In each case, weeks for which all
observed points were imputed are shown in lighter shades. Country codes, shown on the y-axis, are as follows: CIV Côte d'Ivoire, GHA Ghana,
GIN Guinea, LBR Liberia, MLI Mali, NGA Nigeria, SEN Senegal, SLE Sierra Leone, BFA Burkina Faso. The alerts are based on forecasts using
ProMED data, a 2-week calibration window and a 4 week forecast horizon.
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(Supplementary Fig. 51) when such inputs would be particularly
useful.
The risk of spatial spread in our model relies on estimating
movement patterns of infectious cases. Our method also provides
estimates of the probability of cases staying within a country
throughout their infectious period, and the extent to which
distance between two locations affects the flow of infectious cases
between them. The real-time estimates of these parameters over
the course of the epidemic (Supplementary Fig. 34), suggest that
while the relative flow of cases between locations did not vary
substantially over time, the probability of travel across national
borders may have decreased after the initial phase of the
epidemic.
Finally, we quantify the relative risk of importation of a case into
a country from any other currently affected country. The risk of
importation is proportional to the population flow into a country
from all other countries estimated using a mobility model (here,
gravity model) weighted by the infectivity at each country (which
depends on the number of cases and time at which they were
infected, see Methods). Our estimates of the countries with higher
risk of acting as source of importations were largely consistent
with the reported source of cases (Fig. 3). In 4 out of the 5
reported cases of international spread of the epidemic in West
Africa, the model correctly attributed the highest relative risk of
acting as a source of importation (relative risk > 0.9 for importation
into Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone and 0.49 in case of Mali) to
the actual source identified through retrospective epidemiological
and genomic investigations32.
Short-term forecasts. The ability of the model to robustly predict
the future outbreak trajectory was limited and depended on the
data source (Fig. 4) as well as on the time window used for
inference (calibration window) and the forecast horizon. Results
using a 2-week calibration window and a 4-week forecast horizon
using ProMED data are presented in the main text (see
Supplementary Figs. 6 and 7 for other forecast horizons and
calibration windows). Overall, 48.7% of weekly observed incidence
across all three countries were included in the 95% forecast
interval (49.8% and 53.7% for HealthMap and WHO, respectively,
Supplementary Table 1). Typically, model forecasts were 0.5 times
lower or higher than the observed incidence (95% CrI 0.0–32.0)
based on the relative mean absolute error (Fig. 5d), see Methods
for details. We found no evidence of systematic bias in any week
of the forecast horizon (median bias 0.12, Fig. 5a).
Typically, individual forecasts were within 17.0% (95% CrI
0–80%) of the median forecast (based on the median and 95%
CrI for relative sharpness, Fig. 5b, see Methods).
As expected, the robustness of forecasts (both accuracy and
precision) decreased over the forecast horizon (Fig. 5c). In the first
week of the forecast window, 58.0% of observed values (across the
three countries) were within the 95% forecast interval, reducing to
49.4%, 42.3% and 45.0% in the second, third and fourth weeks of
the forecast horizon.
The model performance varied depending on the country and
the phase of the epidemic, defined as "growing”, "declining”, and
"stable” depending on Rt estimates (see phase definitions in
Methods). In general, the model performance was best in the
stable phase with 66.7% of the observations contained in the 95%
forecasts interval (versus 40.2% and 30.8% in the declining and
growing phases, respectively, Supplementary Table 1). However
the forecast uncertainty was largest in the stable phase and
smallest in the growing phase (Fig. 5b). Importantly, in the
growing phase the model tended to over-predict while under-
predicting in the declining phase (Fig. 5a).
Overall, the model performed moderately better using WHO
data compared to ProMED and HealthMap data (Supplementary
Fig. 33) and with shorter calibration windows (Supplementary Fig.
32).
Together with providing operational outputs such as the
predicted short-term incidence in currently affected countries or
the risk of spread to neighbouring countries, our method also
provides near real-time estimates of parameters underlying the
transmission model. First, the reproduction number Rt for each
affected country is estimated over the time-window of inference,
here over the most recent two weeks (Fig. 4), second row). We
found that these near real-time estimates of Rt were in good
agreement with retrospective estimates obtained using the entire
incidence time-series (Fig. 4, bottom row, correlation coefficients
varying between 0.58 and 0.90, Supplementary Fig. 5).
DISCUSSION
The rapid spread of COVID-19 from a province in China to more
than 93 regions and countries around the world has brought into
renewed focus the need for innovative strategies for epidemic
monitoring. In this study, we propose a statistical framework that
relies on digital surveillance data from ProMED or HealthMap to (1)
quantify the short-term risk of spread to other countries, (2) for
countries at risk of importation, quantify where the risk comes
from, and (3) predict the short-term epidemic trajectory in
currently affected countries. We applied our model to data
collected during the West African Ebola epidemic of 2013–2016,
curated by the outbreak analysts at ProMED/HealthMap, and we
compared the model’s outputs to those obtained when using the
data collated by the WHO and made available at the end of the
epidemic.
In spite of the manual curation of the data carried out by
outbreak analysts at ProMED and HealthMap, substantial issues
remained in the quality and consistency of the data feeds. Dealing
with issues such as missing data and inconsistent records will be a
key challenge in using these data for prospective real-time
Fig. 3 Relative risk of importation of the epidemic. For each
country with non-zero incidence, the figure shows the relative
importation risk (see Methods). Since we forecasted every 7th day,
the risk of importation was estimated using forecasts closest to and
before the date of the first case in that country reported in the data
used. The date on which risk was estimated for each country is
shown in the figure. Blue indicates low relative risk while deeper
shades of red represent higher relative risk of acting as a source of
importation. White is used to denote no risk. The estimates
presented here use ProMED data with a 2 week calibration window.
The country for which risk is estimated is shown in grey. The black
circle represents the actual source of importation as retrospectively
identified through epidemiological and genomic investigations. For
each country, the figure shows only the risk of importation from
other countries and does not show the risk of transmission within
the country.
S. Bhatia et al.
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analysis. Despite these challenges, we show the potential of digital
surveillance tools to (1) inform early detection, (2) characterise the
spread, and (3) forecast the future trajectory of outbreaks.
Particularly in an evolving outbreak scenario, when information
from traditional surveillance is limited and only available with a
significant delay, digital surveillance data can be used to
complement the information gap. For instance, during the West
African Ebola epidemic, the first situation report by the WHO was
published only at the end of August 201433, reporting on cases
between January and August 2014. On the other hand, the first
post on ProMED on Ebola cases in Guinea appeared in March
201434. Development of tools that can directly be plugged into
the current digital surveillance ecosystem should therefore be a
growing area of focus. This is further exemplified in the ongoing
outbreak of COVID-19 where substantial efforts have been made
by research groups around the world to collect, process and use
publicly available data to calibrate models informing various
aspects of the epidemiology of COVID-1935–37.
In general, we found that after systematic processing to remove
inconsistencies, data from ProMED and HealthMap were in
reasonably good agreement with the data collected through
traditional surveillance methods and collated by WHO. There may
be multiple reasons underpinning the observed discrepancies
between ProMED and WHO data, including potential variability in
digital surveillance reporting during the course of the epidemic. It
is also worth highlighting that the WHO data used here are an
extensively cleaned version of the data collected during the
epidemic38,39, published more than one year after the epidemic
was declared to be over. Moreover, while ProMED and HealthMap
did not record probable cases for this epidemic, the WHO data
contained confirmed, probable and suspected cases. As news
media reports constitute one of the sources from which both
ProMED/HealthMap extract case numbers, biases in reporting over
the course of an outbreak are likely to have contributed to the
data quality and completeness issues. Despite these discrepancies,
the retrospective national estimates of transmissibility over time
were well correlated across the three data sources. Further,
estimates of transmissibility are typically robust to constant or
slowly changing under-reporting. This suggests that digital
surveillance data are a promising avenue for quantitative
assessment of outbreak dynamics in real-time.
We used the ProMED/HealthMap data to perform a spatio-
temporal analysis of the spread of the West African Ebola
epidemic. We fitted a spatially explicit branching process model
to the daily incidence data derived from ProMED/HealthMap
feeds. The estimated model parameters were used to simulate the
future outbreak trajectory over 4, 6 or 8 weeks. The model
performs relatively well at short forecast horizon, i.e. up to two
weeks. At a longer time scale, the model performance starts to
deteriorate. A likely explanation for this is that our model assumes
that transmissibility remains constant over the entire projection
window. This assumption may not hold as we project over longer
horizons, for example due to interventions being implemented.
Model performance was also highly dependent on the phase of
the epidemic in which projections were made. During the growing
phase, the model tended to over-predict. This is likely due to
interventions implemented throughout the growing phase to
reduce transmissibility, leading to a reduced observed incidence
compared to our model’s expectation. In the declining phase on
the other hand, our model tended to under-predict the observed
incidence. This could be due to control efforts being relaxed too
early as case numbers decline. Another contributing factor could
be super-spreading, a phenomenon observed in many epidemics
including Ebola epidemics40,41 where a small number of cases
generate a large number of secondary infections, implying that
when case numbers are small, epidemic trajectory may be difficult
to predict and not well described by Poisson likelihood. Models
using more complex likelihoods, e.g. using Negative Binomial
Fig. 4 Observed and predicted incidence, and reproduction number estimates from ProMED data. a The weekly incidence derived from
ProMED data and the 4 weeks incidence forecast on log scale. The solid dots represent the observed weekly incidence where the light blue
dots show weeks for which all data points were obtained using interpolation. The projections are made over 4 week windows, based on the
reproduction number estimated in the previous 2 weeks. b The reproduction number used to make forecasts over each 4 week forecast
horizon. c The effective reproduction number estimated retrospectively using the full dataset up to the length of one calibration window
before the end. In each case, the solid black line is the median estimate and the shaded region represents the 95% Credible Interval. The red
horizontal dashed line indicates the Rt= 1 threshold. Results are shown for the three mainly affected countries although the analysis was done
jointly using data for all countries in Africa.
S. Bhatia et al.
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distributions, should be explored in future work, but will present
additional challenges as analytical results underpinning the
estimation of the reproduction number will no longer hold26.
Such variability in model performance throughout an epidemic
could have important implications if the model predictions are
used to inform resource allocation. Model estimates should
therefore be interpreted with caution, particularly as an outbreak
is observed to be declining, and if the forecast horizon is long.
We have shown that our model would have been able to
accurately predict in real-time the international spread of Ebola in
West Africa. Importantly, our model has very high sensitivity,
predicting all instances of observed international spread
1–4 weeks in advance. Choosing a cut-off to maximise sensitivity
led to low model specificity. On occasions the model predicted
cases in countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, where neither WHO nor
ProMED reported any case. However this could be due to
imperfect case reporting. Thus our method could be used with a
high cut-off as a highly sensitive surveillance system with an alert
triggering further epidemiological investigations and implementa-
tion of epidemic preparedness measures.
A key feature of our model is that it provides, for each country
identified as at risk, a map of where the risk comes from. Out of 5
observed instances of international spread of Ebola in West Africa,
our model correctly identified the source of importation in 4 cases
while in the remaining case, the model highlighted the source of
importation while assigning it low relative risk. This could help
translating data collected through digital surveillance into
concrete operational outputs in real-time that could assist in
epidemic management and control.
The systematic collection, storage, organisation and commu-
nication of disease surveillance data were especially challenging
during the West African Ebola epidemic as the deficiencies in
transportation and communication resources, surveillance data
quality and management, human resources and management
structures posed unique challenges in this context42. The
collection of case incidence data and rapid dissemination through
digital surveillance systems was further hampered by the limited
information technology and internet service in the countries most
affected. Thus, for the West African Ebola epidemic, ProMED and
HealthMap data were available at a coarse spatial scale with the
sub-national level information for cases missing in most of the
records. This limited our analysis to the spread of the outbreak
across national borders only, although in principle our model
could deal with data at any spatial scale. Both ProMED and
HealthMap collect more data at a more granular geographic scale
for most outbreaks. Utilising these data to investigate outbreaks
and regions would provide further evidence of the ability of digital
surveillance data to usefully complement data collected from
traditional surveillance. Another interesting research avenue
would be to explore ways of integrating timely data from ProMED
and HealthMap with delayed data from ground surveillance to
generate timely insights into the spatial spread of an outbreak.
Despite its known limitations43, and its application in this work
to large spatial unit (countries), the gravity model of human
movement is shown here to perform well in capturing the spread
of the epidemic, albeit at coarse spatial scale. A related limitation
of our approach is the assumption that the probability that a case
will stay within a country during their infectious period is the same
across all countries. In the absence of explicit mobility data, our
model did not incorporate potentially non-uniform effects of the
origin and destination population sizes on the flow of people. The
availability of fine-grained mobility data would allow us to
perform similar analyses at a more resolved spatial scale, and
calibrate the model when restrictive assumptions are relaxed.
Mobile phone usage data have been used to infer human mobility
patterns to model the spread of diseases44–48. Despite the
potential biases in these data, they can be immensely useful in
understanding the patterns of human mobility at a spatial and
temporal scale relevant to the spread of infectious diseases
outbreaks. Other data sources such data on the number of flights
and/or passengers across countries, or location data from social
media have been used to model the spread of outbreaks49–51.
Fig. 5 Model performance metrics overall and stratified by week of projection and epidemic phase. The performance metrics are a the
percentage of weeks for which the 95% forecast interval contained the observed incidence, b relative mean absolute error, c bias, and d
sharpness. In each panel, the bounds of the box represent the 25th and 75th percentiles and the line corresponds to the median of the
distribution of the respective metric. The whiskers extend to 1.5 * Inter-quartile range in both directions. In forecasting ahead, we assumed
transmissibility to be constant over the forecast horizon. If the 97.5th percentile of the R estimate used for forecasting was less than 1, we
defined the epidemic to be in the declining phase during this period. Similarly, if the 2.5th percentile of R was greater than 1, we defined the
epidemic to be in a growing phase. The phase was set to stable where the 95% Credible Interval of the R estimates contained 1. See Methods
for definitions of each metric.
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However these data are neither free nor easy to acquire and their
utility in near real-time outbreak analytics remains challen-
ging52,53. In limited instances, where organisations have made
aggregated data on human population movement available for
research, these have been used to answer key questions about the
spread of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic54,55.
The framework presented in this paper was developed as a
proof-of-concept to use digital surveillance data for near real-time
forecasting of the spatio-temporal spread of an outbreak. It has
been implemented as a web-based tool called "Mapping the Risk
of International Infectious Disease Spread” (MRIIDS) (see56 for
more information). To further develop such approaches, it is
important to establish an automated pipeline from data collection
to curation and analysis, which currently requires manual
intervention at each of these steps. Although the computational
time needed for data-preprocessing was negligible (in the order of
a few seconds to a minute), extraction of data from a ProMED
report can take from 3 to 10min, depending on the complexity of
the report. Ongoing efforts to automate the extraction of
quantitative information from ProMED and HealthMap57 will
further enhance the utility of these tools for real-time outbreak
analysis. Another factor that could improve the usability of our
model in near real time is to reduce the running time of the fitting
and forward simulation. In the current implementation, the
running time varies from ~0.5 CPU hours when 100 days of
incidence data are being used to ~335 CPU hours using 462 days
of incidence data using a 3.3 GHz Intel Xeon X5680 processor.
Although the West African Ebola epidemic was of unusual scale
and duration, there is a scope for optimising the model
implementation.
Importantly, many other open data sources could be included
in our framework to improve model performance. For example,
data on human mobility could be used to further inform the
parametric form and parameter values of our mobility model. We
have incorporated a simple and well-characterised model of
population movement in the current work. In addition to utilising
other possible data sources, future work could consider other
models of human population movement43. When relevant,
spatially explicit data on population-level immunity to the
circulating pathogen (e.g. following previous epidemics and/or
due to vaccination) could also be used to refine our transmission
model. The effective reproduction number Rti is affected by a
number of factors e.g., the intrinsic transmissibility of a pathogen
or the health care capacity at location i (which could influence for
example the capacity to isolate cases). The model could be easily
extended to explicitly incorporate the dependence of the
reproduction number on such factors. Finally, the impact of the
health capacity of a region to respond to a public health
emergency could also be accounted for in future iterations of
the model.
Ongoing efforts to collate quantitative information on the
performance of health systems and the ability of regions or
countries to respond to an epidemic58,59 can potentially provide
valuable data for future work. Here using a relatively simple
modelling approach we provide one of the first pieces of evidence
of the potential value of digital surveillance for real-time




We used a set of curated ProMED and HealthMap records on the human
cases of Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa. The dates in the feeds ranged
from March 2014 to October 2016. Each dataset recorded the cumulative
number of suspected/confirmed cases and suspected/confirmed deaths by
country at various dates in this period. We derived the country specific
daily and weekly incidence time series from these data after data cleaning
and pre-processing steps that consisted of removing duplicate and/or
inconsistent points, and interpolating the missing points (see Section 1).
The raw and processed data from ProMED and HealthMap for all countries
included in the feed are available in the Github repository for this article.
We also used the West African Ebola incidence data collated by the
WHO during the epidemic which was made available ~1 year after the end
of the epidemic60. This data set is referred to as "WHO data” in the interest
of brevity. The cleaned version of the WHO data consisted of cases
reported between December 2013 and October 2015 in the three most
affected countries - Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. The location of
residence of cases was geo-coded to the second administrative level. We
aggregated the WHO data to national level to match the spatial resolution
of ProMED and HealthMap data that were only available at the
country level.
Since the data collected by ProMED and HealthMap were manually
curated by outbreak analysts, we have used the word "curate” in referring
to their data collection process. Similarly, we refer to the data "collated” by
WHO as WHO coordinated the international response to the outbreak and
in this role, they collated the information from Ministries of Health,
situation reports from NGOs, and local and international medical teams.
As HealthMap uses ProMED alerts in addition to other online data
sources, ProMED represents the more conservative data source between
the two. Therefore we present the results based on ProMED data in the
main text, unless otherwise specified. The analysis based on HealthMap
and WHO data are presented in the Supplementary Information (Sections 3
and 4).
Demographic data
We used LandScanTM 2015 dataset grid61 for population estimates and
centroids for all countries on African mainland. The maps were created
using shapefiles from the GADM database version 3.6 (https://gadm.org).
Statistical model
Our model relies on a well-established statistical framework that assumes
the daily incidence, It, can be approximated with a Poisson process
following the renewal equation25:






Here Rt is the reproduction number at time t (the average number of
secondary cases per infected individual) and ω is the distribution of the
serial interval (the time between onset of symptoms in a case and their
infector).
We extend this model to incorporate the spatial spread of the outbreak
between n different locations. We assume that the number of incident
cases at a location j at time t is given by the equation
Itj  Pois Λtj
 
; (2)
where Λtj is the total infectivity at a location j at time t. Λ
t
j is the sum of
infectivity at all locations weighted by the relative flow of cases into j from












Rti is the reproduction number at location i at time t and pi→j is the
probability of a case moving from location i to location j while they are
infectious. ω is the typical infectiousness profile of a case over time after
infection.
The probability of moving between locations is derived from the relative
flow of populations between locations. This latter quantity can be
estimated using a population flow model; here we use a gravity model62,63.
Under a gravity model, the flow of individuals from area i to area j, ϕi→j, is
proportional to the product of the populations of the two locations, Ni and






The exponent γ modulates the effect of distance on the flow of
populations. A large value of γ indicates that the distances travelled by
populations tend to be short. The probability of movement from location i
S. Bhatia et al.
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to location j where (j ≠ i) is then given by




where pstay is the probability that a case remains in a location i throughout
their infectious period i.e. pstay is pi→i.
Short-term forecasts
To forecast the number of cases and estimate the risk of spatial spread at
time t, we fitted a spatially explicit branching process model to the daily
incidence in all locations up to t− 1. We assumed a single pstay for all
countries on African mainland. For estimating the time-varying reproduc-
tion number for each country, we split the duration of the total outbreak
into intervals of equal width (calibration time window). We assume that
transmissibility in each location stays constant within each time window
and thus, within a time window, we estimated a single reproduction
number for each country with non-zero incidence. We varied the length of
the time window to obtain different models, with short time windows
increasing the number of parameters in the model. We used the estimates
of the effective reproduction number in the last time window to forecast
ahead and assumed that transmissibility remains constant throughout the
forecast horizon.
The results presented in the main text use a calibration time window of
2 weeks and a forecast horizon of 4 weeks (see Supplementary Sections 2.1
and 2.3 for other results).
Relative risk of importation
Let Λtj denote the infectivity at a location j at time t (Eq. (3)) as before. We
define the risk of importation of a case from i into j as the proportion of
total infectivity at j at time t, Λtj , due to infectivity at i. That is,













We assumed a Gamma distributed serial interval with mean 14.2 days and
standard deviation 9.6 days39. For the reproduction number, we used a
Gamma prior with mean 3.3 and variance 1.5. This was informed by a
review of estimates of the reproduction number for Ebola Zaire in
outbreaks preceding the West African Ebola outbreak which reported
estimates ranging from 1.4 to 4.764. The mean prior 3.3 was chosen as the
midpoint of this interval, and the variance 1.5, was chosen so the 95% prior
probability interval contains the extremes of this interval.
Gravity model parameters
For the gravity model parameters pstay and γ, we chose uninformative
uniform priors to allow population movement to be informed by the
epidemiological data. Since pstay is a probability, the prior was a uniform
distribution on the interval [0, 1]. γ was allowed to vary between 1 and 2 in
the results presented in the main text. We performed a sensitivity analysis
where γ has a uniform prior between 1 and 10. The results of this analysis
are presented in the Supplementary Section 8.
Model fitting
To reduce the number of parameters in the model, we divided the
countries with non-zero incidence into 5 groups and forced each country
in a group to have the same reproduction number in each time window.
The first three groups consist of the three mainly affected countries - Sierra
Leone, Guinea and Liberia. The countries that shared a border with these
three countries were grouped together. These were Mali, Côte d’Ivoire,
Guinea-Bissau and Gambia. The rest of the countries were assigned to the
fifth group. A comparison of the performance of different models is
presented in the Supplementary Material (Supplementary Fig. 32).
Model fitting was done in a Bayesian framework using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) as implemented in the software Stan65 and its R
interface rstan66. We ran 2 MCMC chains with 3000 iterations and burn-in
of 1000 iterations. Convergence of MCMC chains was confirmed using
visual inspections of the diagnostics (Potential Scale Reduction Factor67
and Geweke Diagnostics68) reported by R package ggmcmc69. An example
report produced by ggmcmc is included in the Supplementary Material.
For each model (i.e., for each choice of the time window), we made
forward projections every 7th day, over a 2 week, 4 week and 6 week
horizon. To forecast incidence from day t onwards, we fitted the model to
the daily incidence series up to day t− 1. We then sampled 1000
parameter sets (reproduction numbers for each location in each time
window and parameters of the gravity model) from the joint posterior
distribution, and for each parameter set, simulated one future epidemic
trajectory according to equation (1), assuming that future Rt is equal to the
last estimated Rt value in each location.
Model validation
Given the retrospective nature of our analysis, we validated the incidence
projected using our model against observed incidence, using the data
source which was used to fit the model. That is, when the model was fitted
to ProMED (respectively HealthMap/WHO) data, the projected incidence
was compared with the observed incidence in the ProMED (respectively
HealthMap/WHO) data. When comparing the model performance across
the three data sources, we restricted model outputs to the dates for which
data from all three sources was available (12th April 2014 to 2nd January
2016, from ProMED data).
In addition to the accuracy of the forecasted incidence, the uncertainty
associated with the forecasts (e.g., measured by the width of the prediction
interval) is an important indicator of model performance. A narrow prediction
interval that contains the observed values is preferable over wide prediction
intervals. To assess the performance of the model along both these
dimensions, we used four different metrics drawn from the literature.
In the remainder of this paper, we use the following notation. For a location
j, let Itj be the observed incidence at time t and let Î
t
j be the set of predictions






j ; ¼ Î
t;N
j g is the set of N draws from
the Poisson distribution with mean Λtj (Equation 1) (here N= 1000).
Relative mean absolute error. The relative mean absolute error (rmae) is a
widely used measure of model accuracy70. The relative mean absolute
error for the forecasts at a location j at time t is defined as:




s¼1 jItj  Î
t;s
j j
N  ðItj þ 1Þ
: (7)
That is the mean absolute error at time t is averaged across all simulated
incidence trajectories and normalised by the observed incidence. We add 1
to the observed value to prevent division by 0. A rmae value of k means
that the average error is k times the observed value.
Sharpness. Sharpness is a measure of the spread (or uncertainty) of the
forecasts. Adapting the definition proposed by Funk et al.71, we used the
relative mean deviation about the median to evaluate sharpness. The
sharpness stj of forecasts at time t at location j is
stj ð̂I
t












We add 1 to Î
t
j to prevent division by 0. A sharpness score of k indicates
that the average deviation of the predicted incidence trajectories is k times
their median. Low values of sharpness therefore suggest that the predicted
trajectories are clustered around the median.
Bias. The bias of forecasts is a measure of the tendency of a model to
systematically under- or over-predict71. The bias of a set of predictions Î
t
j at
time t at location j is defined as
btj ðItj ; Î
t







where the mean is taken across the N draws. H(x) is the Heaviside step
function defined as
HðxÞ ¼
0 if x < 0
1 if x > 0




S. Bhatia et al.
8
npj Digital Medicine (2021)    73 Published in partnership with Seoul National University Bundang Hospital
The above formulation can better be understood by considering the
following extreme scenarios. If every projected value Î
t
j is greater than the





is 1. The bias for a model that always over-predicts is
therefore 1. On the other hand, if the model systematically under-predicts,




is 0 and the bias is -1. For a model for which all
predictions match the observed values exactly, the bias is 0.
Epidemic phase
We defined the epidemic to be in a "growing" phase at time t if the 2.5th
percentile of the distribution of the reproduction number at this time was
greater than 1. Similarly, the epidemic was defined to be in "declining"
phase if the 97.5th percentile of the distribution of the reproduction
number was below 1. In all other cases, the epidemic was defined to be in
a "stable" phase.
Reporting summary
Further information on research design is available in the Nature Research
Reporting Summary linked to this article.
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